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Abstract
This article explores the implications of the proliferation of labour provisions in free 
trade agreements (FTAs) in recent years. It reviews a relatively new form of empirical 
scholarship on the effectiveness of US and EU labour provisions. In doing so, it helps 
to identify a large gap between, on the one hand, the rhetoric of policymakers on the 
importance of such provisions and, on the other, the reality of what they achieve in 
practice. Reform efforts on both sides of the Atlantic are then examined to find that 
these also contain major deficiencies. The article therefore asks whether the ineffec-
tiveness of the labour rights agenda in FTAs should be seen as part of a burgeoning 
class critique of trade policy. In the current political climate, it also suggests that the 
deficiencies identified, and how they should be resolved, require far greater engage-
ment from both mainstream academia and trade policy communities.
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1 Introduction
One telling of the trade and labour ‘linkage’ story has it following a similar 
trajectory to other recent trade and investment law issues discussed in this 
Special Issue. Deadlock at the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been 
followed by an upsurge in the prevalence of labour provisions within free 
trade agreements (FTAs). Viewed from this perspective, the story of trade 
and labour appears to be a triumph for the agendas of developed countries, 
who have long championed the inclusion of labour provisions, over develop-
ing countries, who fought for their exclusion. But there is also another story 
unfolding which a relatively new form of empirical scholarship across the 
social sciences has helped to tell: the failures and deficiencies of labour provi-
sions in relation to exactly those workers’ rights they are supposed to protect 
and promote.
In this article, it will be argued that it is the failures that are more significant, 
and that these failures raise questions of critical importance for trade policy-
making in the future. Policymakers have used the presence of ‘strong’ labour 
provisions in trade agreements to argue that the social consequences of trade 
commitments are taken seriously. How are they now responding, and how 
should they respond in the future, to the serious deficiencies in those provi-
sions which are becoming apparent? At the same time, is the ineffectiveness of 
labour provisions becoming part of a burgeoning class critique of trade policy? 
And do these issues require greater engagement from mainstream academic 
and trade policy communities?
The article starts by recalling the history of the trade and labour  linkage, 
and how it has played out within the WTO and in the trade agendas of the 
major proponents for their inclusion within trade agreements. It explores 
how, since the deadlock at the WTO, the number of trade agreements that 
include labour provisions have expanded greatly (Section 2). Thereafter, it 
focuses on two leading proponents of labour provisions in trade  agreements, 
the United States and the European Union (EU), explains how their models 
 function, and identifies key limitations and failings (Sections 3 and 4). Then, 
the recent efforts that have been made to strengthen labour provisions on 
both sides of the Atlantic are examined (Section 5). The results of these reform 
efforts are scrutinised, with concern raised about their limited ambition. In 
 conclusion, it is argued that a paradigm shift is needed to spur engagement 
of academic and trade policy communities with the labour rights agenda 
(Section 6).
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2 The Bilateral Surge
There is a long history of legislating on labour rights and international trade 
that started well before the advent of the multilateral trade regime. From the 
1890s onwards, various national laws and international treaties prohibited, 
inter alia, the import of slaves and goods produced by prison labour.1 The 
prohibition on goods made by prisoners found its way into the general 
exception clause of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
under Article XX(e). Otherwise, efforts to include labour rights within the 
multilateral trading system remained unsuccessful. Since its inception in 
the  mid-twentieth century, there were periodic attempts to have labour 
 conditionality, often as part of a wider social clause, included within the 
GATT and subsequently the WTO. This was generally the result of proposals 
put forward by the United States and supported by various other developed 
 countries,  including EU Member States. Whereas such endeavours date back 
to the 1950s, their prominence reached new heights in the run-up to the 1996 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, where they became a major stum-
bling block for the trade negotiations.2 The Singapore Declaration3 resulting 
from that meeting clarified that the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
was the proper forum to address labour rights issues, and that the WTO should 
not be taking on a role with regard to enforceable standards that would allow 
States to impose trade restrictions.4 The rationale behind this approach was 
that many developing countries were concerned that a failure to adhere to 
labour rights contained in trade agreements would allow developed trade 
partners to retaliate through the WTO’s relatively powerful dispute settlement 
mechanism.5 Labour issues also became a major issue leading up to the WTO 
Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999. The breakdown of the conference was, 
to a certain extent, due to proposals for enforceable labour standards within 
1   Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading 
Regime – A Historical Overview’ (1987) 126 Intl Lab Rev 565.
2   Virginia A Leary, ‘The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore’ (1997) 1 EJIL 118, 119. Leary 
reports that at the Conference, an invitation to the ILO to speak was withdrawn due to objec-
tions from developing countries as to the discussion of labour issues at the meeting.
3   Singapore Ministerial Declaration (13 December 1996) WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, para 4.
4   For a more detailed description of the process leading up to the Singapore Declaration and 
its aftermath, including the United States’ reaction, see Steve Charnovitz (ed), Trade Law and 
Global Governance (Cameron May 2002) 258.
5   See James Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Hart 
Publishing 2007) ch 5 for a more detailed exposition of these events.
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the WTO framework: US President Bill Clinton publicly stated that a proposed 
working group, established to look into issues of trade and labour linkage, 
should define a set of core labour standards that would then be incorporated 
as enforceable provisions into all WTO agreements. This united developing 
countries in opposition and, in the words of one commentator, ‘sealed the fate 
of the Seattle conference’.6 At the following WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, WTO members reaffirmed that the ILO was the competent body to set 
and deal with labour standards.7
Since the Doha Ministerial Conference, there have been no serious attempts 
to include labour provisions into multilateral trade agreements.8 However, they 
have had a resurgence in the bilateral and regional setting.9 The number of 
FTAs negotiated in recent years that include labour provisions has expanded 
enormously. While there were only three trade agreements with labour provi-
sions in 1995, this increased to 77 by 2016, elevating the overall share of trade 
agreements with labour provisions from 7.3 per cent in 1995 to 28.8 per cent 
in 2016.10 Fuelling this surge are a number of countries that had been push-
ing for labour inclusion at the WTO. The EU and the United States, alongside 
Canada, have been particularly active in concluding trade agreements that 
incorporate labour standards in recent years. But they are not alone, and the 
presence of labour provisions in trade agreements is increasingly becoming a 
global phenomenon. As of 2016, 136 countries had at least one trade agreement 
that included labour provisions.11
It is therefore possible to tell a story that is familiar in many other areas 
of international trade law. On a range of issues, from stronger forms of intel-
lectual property protection, to enhanced protection for investors, developed 
countries have seen their negotiating agendas blocked in the WTO, but have 
managed to be far more successful in the bilateral or preferential setting. 
6    Aravind Panagaryia, ‘Trade-Labour Link: A Post-Seattle Analysis’ in Zdenek Drabek (ed), 
Globalisation under Threat: The Stability of Trade Policy and Multilateral Agreements 
(Edward Elgar 2001) 102, 288.
7    Kofi Addo, ‘The Correlation Between Labour Standards and International Trade – Which 
Way Forward?’ (2002) 36 JWT 285.
8    Jan Orbie, ‘Promoting Labour Standards Through Trade: Normative Power or Regulatory 
State Europe’ in Richard G Whitman (ed), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and 
Theoretical Perspectives (Palgrave MacMillan 2011) 161.
9    Beyond the scope of this article, both the US and the EU had begun to link their unilateral 
trade preferences (known as Generalised System of Preferences or GSP) to minimum 
labour standards from the 1980s onwards. See Brian Burgoon, ‘The Rise and Stall of Labor 
Linkage in Globalization Politics’ (2004) 41 Intl Pol 196.
10   International Labour Organisation, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade 
and Investment Agreements (ILO 2017) 11 (ILO Handbook).
11   ibid 13. Although it should be noted that there are marked regional differences.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/03/2019 02:00:09PM
via free access
709The Labour Rights Agenda in Free Trade Agreements
Journal of World Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 705–725
The negotiating dynamics of bilateral and regional agreements have been 
more conducive to the fulfilment of agendas that were toxic in the multilat-
eral  setting. There is less focused media and civil society attention, and more 
powerful countries are able to push their agendas more successfully when less 
powerful countries cannot group together in large blocs, as is the case at the 
WTO.12 Viewed through this lens, the trade and labour story looks like a victory 
for developed countries over the interests of developing countries. Scholars in 
the 1990s predicted that this victory could lead to the unjustified exclusion of 
developing country goods from developed country markets.13 Have those fears 
now become a reality?
There is evidence to suggest a more nuanced picture. There has been no 
suggestion that any of the labour provisions that have come into force have led 
to disguised protectionism in practice. At the same time, the labour agenda in 
trade agreements is no longer something only pushed by developed countries. 
A quarter of all trade agreements with labour provisions are now between 
developing country trading partners (i.e. do not include developed countries), 
including many States in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.14 Does this 
imply that at least some developing countries have abandoned their opposi-
tion to a trade-labour linkage at the WTO and would sign up to such provisions 
even in the absence of pressure from their developed counterparts? Or have 
the labour provisions themselves changed so that they are no longer feared? 
In order to obtain a more fine-grained understanding, one needs to investigate 
the substance of the labour provisions that have been negotiated, what they 
have sought to achieve, and the effects that such provisions have had among 
trade partners and the wider global economy. It is only then that one can assess 
whether meaningful labour provisions have become a widely accepted part of 
trade agreements around the world.
While labour provisions within trade agreements are now plentiful across 
the globe, the United States and the EU remain the most high-profile propo-
nents of linkage, their models of protection are regularly contrasted within 
the academic literature, and those models have been followed, to varying 
degrees, by other countries. In the following two sections, these two models 
are explained and critically evaluated.
Our ability to tell this critical story is fuelled by a relatively new form of 
empirical study which is still rare in relation to any form of legal scholarship on 
12   On intellectual property and access to medicines, see eg Susan Sell, ‘TRIPS-Plus Free 
Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines’ (2007) 28 Liverpool L Rev 41.
13   For a review of early trade-labour linkage debates, see Lance Compa and Stephen 
Diamond (eds), Human Rights, Labor Rights and Trade (U Penn Press 1996).
14   See ILO Handbook (n 10).
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international trade law obligations.15 In the narrower field of academic study 
of the trade-labour linkage, either the text of labour provisions or jurispru-
dence of dispute settlement have been the traditional focus.16 More recently, 
 however, scholars have sought to investigate, through qualitative empirical 
study, how labour provisions have been implemented via the institutional 
frameworks created by the trade agreements, as well as by government officials 
of the treaty parties.17 Viewed from this perspective, the unfolding  controversy 
over labour provisions relates to their failure to significantly impact those 
workers’ rights they are supposed to protect and promote. This stands distinct 
from controversies on other issues where deadlock at the WTO eventually led 
to inclusion of commitments in FTAs. Most significantly, intellectual property 
and investor protection provisions in trade agreements have been contentious 
due to their potential to impose restrictions on governments’ regulatory auton-
omy and, thereby, offer valuable protection to investors and intellectual  property 
holders.18 This raises questions about whether the failures and limitations of 
provisions designed to protect the rights of workers, explored in greater detail 
below, need to be viewed alongside the relative success of provisions designed 
to protect the interests of capital (investors and intellectual property holders).
3 The EU Approach to Labour Standards Provisions
The EU’s trade agreements have consistently contained provisions on labour 
standards since 1999, when it concluded its agreement with South Africa.19 
15   For instance, there are no articles in the Journal of World Investment and Trade, Journal of 
International Economic Law or Journal of World Trade over the last 3 years (2016–2018) which 
conduct empirical investigations of the impact of trade or investment law obligations. 
Linda J Allen, ‘Reassessing the “Green” in NAFTA’ (2018) 52 JWT 557 contains extensive 
references to empirical work elsewhere on the impacts of NAFTA to support the argu-
ments made in the article, but does not itself present detailed empirical research findings.
16   See eg Kofi Addo, Core Labour Standards and International Trade (Springer 2015). As will 
be discussed below, such cases are a rare occurrence in relation to most trade agreements.
17   This literature is extensively discussed in Sections 3 and 4 below.
18   For a summary of key arguments in relation to the significant impacts of international 
investment protection, see Emma Aisbett and others, Rethinking International Investment 
Governance: Principles for the 21st Century (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
2018) chs 6–8. Charting many of the significant impacts of intellectual property pro-
tection in EU trade agreements, Josef Drexl, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan and Souheir 
Nadde-Phlix (eds), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or 
Worse? (Springer 2014).
19   Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation Between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the Other Part 
[1999] OJ L311/3.
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Its approach has gradually evolved over time and formalised with the signa-
ture of the EU-Korea FTA in 2010, when the EU’s labour rights provisions 
were packaged together with rules concerning environmental protection in a 
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ (TSD) chapter.20 This chapter has since 
become a standard part of the agreements the EU negotiates with its trading 
partners.21
While there is some variation between the provisions in the different 
agreements as a result of the outcome of negotiations with individual treaty 
 partners, there are core elements to be found in TSD chapters across all recent 
EU trade deals. In each agreement, the same approach can be identified as 
to the context in which labour standards are invoked, the substantive labour 
standards relied upon, the institutional structures created, and the manner in 
which complaints are handled.
Setting the context, each agreement recognises the importance of labour 
standards if trade agreements are to promote sustainable development and 
globalisation is to create widespread social benefits.22 In terms of substan-
tive  standards, all the agreements involve the parties making commitments 
in relation to the ILO’s Core Labour Standards, i.e. freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of collective bargaining, the elimination of forced 
and compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour, and the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Commitments 
to  substantive standards are accompanied by a range of procedural 
 commitments, including on dialogue and co-operation (via the institutional 
structures  mentioned below); transparency when introducing new labour 
standard  measures domestically; monitoring and review of how the agreement 
affects sustainability; a commitment to uphold levels of domestic protection 
20   Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One 
Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part [2011] OJ L127/6.
21   As of December 2018, such chapters feature in finalised agreements with Canada, 
Colombia/Peru, Central America, Georgia, Moldova, Singapore, the Southern African 
Development Community, Ukraine, and Vietnam. Exceptions include the Economic 
Partnership Agreements with East African Community, with Economic Community of 
West African States, and with Central Africa, which are notable because they were negoti-
ated over the same years as some of other agreements that do contain labour provisions.
22   For example, Council Decision (2014/492/EU) of 16 June 2014 on the signing, on behalf 
of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement 
Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and Their 
Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other Part [2014] 
OJ L260/1, Article 365 of the Trade and Sustainability chapter states that the EU and 
Moldova ‘reaffirm their commitment to promote the development of international 
trade in a way that is conducive to full and productive employment and decent work 
for all.’
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in relation to labour rights; a commitment not to use labour standards for the 
purposes of disguised protectionism and to uphold existing domestic labour 
laws; and a commitment not to weaken or waive laws to encourage trade or 
investment.23
In terms of institutional oversight, all the chapters include the estab-
lishment of a joint committee composed of official representatives from 
the two parties who will oversee the implementation of the chapter. This is 
accompanied by a civil society mechanism (CSM) bringing together repre-
sentatives of  business, trade unions, NGOs, and (occasionally) academia in 
so-called Domestic Advisory Groups, and facilitating international dialogue 
between these parties through a civil society forum. The dispute settle-
ment process applicable to the other chapters of the agreement, allowing a 
complaint that could result in the suspension of trade preferences vis-à-vis 
the other party, is not available (i.e. there is no sanctioning power). Rather, 
 complaints are handled by a panel of experts whose role is simply to report its 
findings in a manner consistent with the institutional framework established 
under each agreement.24
EU policymakers have placed significant emphasis on these TSD chapters 
and the labour standards contained within them. The Directorate-General 
for Trade, in its strategic plan for 2016–2020, has recognised that trade policy 
has come under increased public and civil society scrutiny, and that ‘strong 
provisions [in FTAs] to promote the respect of labour rights’ are key to the 
response.25 Labour provisions are presented as crucial to ensure trade is ‘for all’ 
and ‘not just about economics, but about values’.26 As such, the EU’s approach 
is often characterised by, inter alia, the European Commission as ‘ universalist’ 
in character insofar that its aim is to use labour provisions in trade agree-
ments to gradually improve labour standards worldwide.27 Nowhere does 
the Commission argue that its labour provisions are intended to protect EU 
industry from ‘unfair’ competition based on the cheaper costs of labour in 
 countries where workers’ rights are exploited once trade agreements have 
23   For instance EU-Korea FTA, ch 13.
24   ibid. For more detail on the key aspects of this model, see Lorand Bartels, ‘Human Rights 
and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (2013) 40 
LIEI 297.
25   Commission, DG Trade, ‘Strategic Plan 2016–2020’ (2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/ 
publications/strategic-plan-2016-2020-trade_en> accessed 19 July 2019.
26   Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy 
(EU 2015); Cecilia Malmström, ‘Responsible Supply Chains: What’s the EU Doing?’ (EU 
and Global Value Chains conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 7 December 2015).
27   See Orbie (n 8).
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come into force.28 This is not to say that the latter rationale should be outright 
 discounted. Many lobbies and citizens across Europe do appear concerned 
about the effects of opening up markets without safeguarding fundamental 
workers’ rights in trade partners.29 Ultimately, if one is to judge their impact, it 
is more valuable to understand how labour provisions have worked in practice, 
rather than to rely on statements about their intended goals.
There is now a growing literature about the effects of EU labour provi-
sions on the protection and promotion of labour standards in trade partner 
 countries. A number of studies have examined the effectiveness of the EU’s 
TSD chapters based on extensive interviews and analysis of documentary 
 evidence, in trading partners as well as the EU.30 These studies have identified 
a series of important limitations and failings in the current operation of the 
EU’s TSD chapters.
Key failings include the fact that relevant officials in both the EU and in 
trade partners lack detailed knowledge of labour issues and/or do not see them 
as a priority issue.31 As a result, insufficient attention has been paid to the com-
plex and varied labour issues encountered in the EU’s diverse trading partners, 
and to how TSD chapters can effectively engage with them.32 Simultaneously, 
despite the formally reciprocal nature of the obligations in labour chapters, 
labour issues within the EU are barely considered.33 Studies also find that 
CSMs within FTAs are undermined by serious operational  failings, including 
28   This rationale is not found in any of the policy documents that spells out EU policy on 
trade and labour.
29   See eg Marion Jansen, Ralf Peters and José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs (eds), Trade and 
Employment: From Myths to Facts (ILO 2011) 2; The Alternative Trade Mandate Alliance, 
‘Trade: Time for a New Vision’ (2014) <www.s2bnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
11/trade-time_for_a_new_vision1.pdf> accessed 19 July 2019.
30   This literature is reviewed in James Harrison and others, ‘Labour Standards Provisions in 
EU Free Trade Agreements: Reflections on the European Commission’s Reform Agenda’ 
(2018) WTR 1.
31   See eg Axel Marx, Brecht Lein and Nicolas Brando, ‘The Protection of Labour Rights in 
Trade Agreements: The Case of the EU-Colombia Agreement’ (2016) 50 JWT 587; Jan 
Orbie and Lore Van den Putte, ‘Labour Rights in Peru and the EU Trade Agreement: 
Compliance with the Commitments Under the Sustainable Development Chapter’ (2016) 
OFSE Working Paper 58 <www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/145974> accessed 19 July 2019; 
James Harrison and others, ‘Governing Labour Standards Through Free Trade Agreements: 
Limits of the European Union’s Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters’ (2018) 57 
J Common Mkt Stud 260.
32   Harrison and others (n 30).
33   ibid 12. Harrison and colleagues question whether the EU’s model is really a two-way 
process of dialogue or whether it is rather is a form of ‘sophisticated unilateralism’. While 
labour violations may be more serious in many of the EU’s trading partners, there are also 
many serious problems within the EU, eg in relation to the rights of migrant workers.
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a lack of resources and insufficient time in meetings to address labour issues.34 
The overall purpose and function of CSMs are also unclear.35 Cooperative 
activities, which are envisaged as central to the ethos of the TSD chapters, 
have not been systematically implemented.36 When conflicts do arise over 
whether obligations have been fulfilled, the ‘soft’ dispute resolution provisions 
are inadequate to resolve such situations. The absence of a threat of mean-
ingful sanctions translates into a limited deterrent effect. Furthermore, even 
where clear breaches have occurred, the European Commission has been 
reluctant to invoke the dispute resolution option.37 Finally, the monitoring of 
the ‘ sustainability’ impact of the agreements themselves, including how the 
obligations across the agreements have had positive and negative impacts 
on the lives of workers, has not been properly operationalised.38
The breadth of these failings justifies the conclusion that TSD chapters, as 
currently constituted, seem incapable of having any significant effect.39 Such a 
view is not found only within academia. Many trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations, and members of the European Parliament have likewise been 
heavily critical of TSD chapters.40 This assessment of the functioning of the 
TSD chapters led the European Commission to embark upon a reform agenda 
(see Section 5). But what is clear is that the EU has neither relied on its signifi-
cant ‘market power’ to push for labour provisions that have significant impacts 
within trade partners, nor has it successfully used persuasion to export the 
norms and principles embodied within the core ILO conventions it purports to 
34   See eg Lore Van den Putte, ‘Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work 
Agenda’ (2015) 6 Glob Lab J 221; Marx and others (n 31); Orbie and Van Den Putte (n 31); 
Harrison and others (n 31).
35   Harrison and others (n 30).
36   ibid; Franz Ebert, ‘Labour Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’ (2016) 155 Intl Lab Rev 407.
37   See eg Angie N Tran, Jennifer Bair and Marion Werner, ‘Forcing Change from the 
Outside? The Role of Trade-Labour Linkages in Transforming Vietnam’s Labour Regime’ 
(2017) 21 Comp & Change 397; Marx and others (n 31); Ebert (n 36); Harrison and 
others (n 31).
38   Marx and others (n 31); Harrison and others (n 31).
39   Harrison and others (n 31).
40   The extent of criticism of TSD chapters can best be seen by many of the responses 
received by the Commission to its unofficial consultations, see Letter from Klaus Müller, 
Executive Director of the Federation of German Consumer Organisations, to Sandra 
Gallina, Deputy Director-General, DG Trade (9 November 2017). See also the European 
Commission’s own characterisation of the issue at Commission, ‘Trade and Sustainable 
Development (TSD) Chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)’ (2017) Non-Paper 
of the Commission Services, 2 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc 
_155686.pdf> accessed 19 July 2019.
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promote.41 However, the limitations of the EU model have been disseminated 
through its trade agreements to other countries, some of whom have then 
 copied it, with some variation, in their trade agreements with third parties.42
4 The US Approach to Labour Standards Provisions
The origins of the US approach are found in the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico.43 
NAFTA was the first US trade agreement to include labour provisions, albeit 
in a side agreement.44 Since then, every FTA signed by the United States 
has included labour provisions – now totalling agreements involving 20 
countries.45 Labour provisions have also become more central to US FTAs. 
From the 2004 FTAs with Chile and Singapore onward, labour provisions have 
been set out in a dedicated ‘Labour Chapter’.
The US labour chapters share similar features across agreements with 
different trade partners.46 However, the common formulation approach is 
somewhat weaker in the US model due to the fact that changes in political 
administrations have led to changes in the approach to the labour provisions 
within FTAs. Still, an evolving ‘pre-Trump’ approach, as developed through the 
Bush and Obama administrations, can be identified. There is significant over-
lap with the EU approach.47 Both create commitments in relation to the ILO’s 
41   On the concept of EU market power, see Chad Damro, ‘Market Power Europe’ (2012) 19 
JEPP 682. In relation to the normative power of the EU, see Ian Manners, ‘The Social 
Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative Power Perspective’ (2009) 
14 EFA Rev 785.
42   See International Labour Organisation, Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements 
(IILS 2013).
43   The North American Free Trade Agreement (signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 
1 January 1994) 32 ILM 289, 605.
44   The side agreement was the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (opened 
for signature 8 September 1993, entered into force 1 January 1994) 32 ILM 1499 (NAALC). 
NAALC sets out a series of ‘Labour Principles’ which all three parties to NAFTA commit 
to promote.
45   These are with Australia, Bahrain, CAFTA-DR (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua), Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Republic of 
Korea, NAFTA (Canada, Mexico), Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore.
46   For a much more detailed elaboration of this approach, see Jeffrey Vogt, ‘The Evolution of 
Labor Rights and Trade – A Transatlantic Comparison and Lessons for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership’ (2015) 18 JIEL 827.
47   Ferdi De Ville, Jan Orbie and Lore Van den Putte, ‘TTIP and Labour Standards’ (2016) 
European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, IP/A/EMPL/2015-07.
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core labour standards,48 seek to prevent a weakening of labour law to attract 
investment, seek to involve civil society in the negotiation and monitoring of 
provisions,49 involve cooperative activity aimed at strengthening labour rights 
between the parties, and establish dispute settlement procedures involving 
inter-governmental dialogue and panels of adjudicators.50
But there are also significant differences. Unlike the EU, there has been no 
effort by the United States to package labour provisions as part of a broader 
approach to tackle the ‘sustainable development’ dimensions of trade relation-
ships. Labour and environmental issues are addressed in separate chapters. 
The implications of this difference are most clearly seen in the monitoring and 
reporting processes created by the two agreements. Whereas the EU model con-
tains an obligation to monitor and review the sustainability (including labour) 
impacts of the agreement itself, the US model concentrates on reporting in rela-
tion to relevant labour issues within the parties to the agreement. The US model 
thus focuses on reaching out to address labour issues in the domestic systems 
of its trade partners. The EU model, on the other hand, centres – at least in 
theory – on reaching into the trade agreement to ascertain how the new trad-
ing relationship itself will affect conditions for workers, together with broader 
social and environmental impacts, once the trade agreement comes into force.
In terms of substantive standards, the US approach includes commitments 
to respect ‘internationally recognised labor rights’, and reference is made to 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). 
But there is neither a commitment from parties to the agreement to sign and 
ratify the ILO’s core conventions, nor to effectively implement them once in 
force (The United States itself has only ratified two of the eight fundamen-
tal conventions).51 Rather, the United States has prioritised efforts to improve 
national legal processes for the enforcement of labour rights.52
48   Although there is an important debate about the legal effects of referencing only the ILO 
Declaration, as opposed to directly referencing the ILO Conventions in the text of trade 
agreements. Jordi Agustí-Panareda, Franz C Ebert and Desirée LeClercq, ‘Labour Provisions 
in Free Trade Agreements: Fostering Their Consistency with the ILO Standards System’ 
(2014) ILO Background Paper <www.ilo.org/inst/projects/labour-standards-in-trade-and 
-investment-arrangements/WCMS_237940/lang-en/index.htm> accessed 19 July 2019.
49   The US approach involves a Labor Affairs Council comprised of high-level representa-
tives of the parties, a Labor Cooperation Mechanism to promote joint activities by State 
officials and encourage each party to establish a National Labor Advisory Committee 
comprised of civil society actors to give advice on implementation.
50   De Ville, Orbie and Van den Putte (n 47) provide a comparative overview.
51   On the debate about the legal effects of referencing only the ILO Declaration, as 
opposed to directly referencing the ILO Conventions in the text of trade agreements, see 
Agustí-Panareda, Ebert and LeClercq (n 48).
52   De Ville, Orbie and Van den Putte (n 47).
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The United States has a different model of enforcement of its labour provi-
sions vis-à-vis its trading partners. While the resolution of disputes between 
State Parties to FTAs start with similar consultation processes as undertaken 
through the EU model, complaints that cannot be resolved through consul-
tations are subject to the same dispute settlement process as those arising 
out of commercial chapters of the trade agreement, although the procedures 
and penalties for non-compliance can differ. For instance, in the United 
States-Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (US-DR-CAFTA), there is 
a limit of USD 15 million on the compensation that can be imposed for non-
implementation of labour laws, whereas for non-implementation of other 
obligations in the agreement (e.g. intellectual property), the penalty that can 
be imposed is unrestricted.53 Despite such limits on sanctions available, this 
model differs greatly from the soft advisory role of the complaints mechanism 
under the EU model.
As in the EU, labour provisions have played an important role in legiti-
mating overall US trade policy, and became significant pre-conditions for 
trade agreements to gain the necessary political support domestically.54 Also, 
similar to EU labour provisions, US provisions have been a means of demon-
strating the universalist concern about the importance of protecting workers’ 
rights globally.55 Alongside this, and contrary to the EU, US administrations 
have explicitly stated that labour provisions are included in trade agreements 
to address fears of competition from abroad. They have been seen as impor-
tant in demonstrating to key US constituencies that the US administration is 
keeping a ‘level playing field’ on labour rights between the United States and 
its trading partners.56 As explored in Section 5 below, this latter rationale has 
become dominant under the Trump administration.
To a limited degree, academic analysis has identified more significant effects 
from the US approach. Compared to the EU, the United States has taken stron-
ger action with regard to pushing for labour law reform before signing trade 
agreements – using so-called pre-ratification conditionality. There is evidence, 
for instance, that pressure from US authorities to take action resulted in leg-
islative changes to improve labour law protections and/or led to other actions 
(e.g. the hiring of more labour inspectors) before FTAs with Bahrain, Columbia, 
53   A critique of CAFTA’s dispute settlement provisions in relation to labour, and how these 
are handled compared to those in commercial disputes, can be found in Vogt (n 46) 832.
54   Holger Janusch, ‘Labor Standards in US Trade Politics’ (2015) 49 JWT 1047.
55   Office of the US Trade Representative, ‘Labor’ <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor> accessed 
19 July 2019.
56   Office of the US Trade Representative, ‘Trade Policy: A Level Playing Field for American 
Workers’ (July 2009) <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/ 
2009/july/trade-policy-level-playing-field-american-workers> accessed 19 July 2019.
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Morocco, Oman, and Panama came into force.57 But such actions do not nec-
essarily mean that the most serious labour issues were effectively addressed 
prior to ratification. For instance, evaluations of the labour reforms actually 
carried out in Peru and Colombia found that serious deficiencies remained 
unaddressed, both in terms of the relevant laws and their implementation.58
Once an agreement has entered into force, it is the US agreements’ stronger 
form of dispute settlement procedures that has been widely seen as important 
to the United States’ ability to induce its trade partners to ensure de jure and 
de facto protection of labour rights.59 First, the threat of meaningful sanctions 
creates a more powerful incentive towards action in the dialogue and coopera-
tive activity which occurs through the Labour Chapters. However, such oppor-
tunities have not always been taken by US officials for whom engagement with 
labour commitments has not generally been a priority.60 Second, as a result 
of the more open US complaints process, complaints have been brought by 
trade unions and labour NGOs from the United States and its trading partners. 
These are initially investigated by the US Department of Labor. Such complaints 
have been investigated in seven countries to date, resulting in various follow-ups, 
including government-level action plans.61 However, action plans are not always 
enacted in practice, and there is scepticism about whether interactions between 
the US Government and the governments in trading partners has actually led 
to better conditions for workers at the level of individual enterprises operating 
within the territory of the United States’ trading partners.62
57   JF Hornbeck, ‘Free Trade Agreements: US Promotion and Oversight of Latin American 
Implementation’ (2009) Inter-American Development Bank PB-I02 <https://publications 
.iadb.org/en/publication/free-trade-agreements-us-promotion-and-oversight-latin 
-american-implementation> accessed 19 July 2019; Vogt (n 46).
58   Vogt (n 46) 837. As in the EU, the formal reciprocity of these commitments, in practice, 
only works one way – there is never pressure on the US in relation to labour law or its 
implementation.
59   Tran, Bair and Werner (n 37).
60   See US Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Finance, US Senate, ‘Four Free Trade Agreements GAO Reviewed Have Resulted in 
Commercial Benefits, but Challenges on Labor and Environment Remain’ (July 2009)
GAO-09–439, 52. The report states ‘[w]ith respect to the labor obligations in these FTAs, 
the responsible US agencies have made little or no effort, or a belated effort, to identify 
labor compliance concerns after FTA enactment, and engagement with these partners 
on labor issues has been a low priority most of the time.’
61   These are Bahrain, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and 
Peru. See US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, ‘Submissions 
Under Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements’ <www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our 
-work/trade/fta-submissions> accessed 19 July 2019.
62   Vogt (n 46) 858.
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Only one case has so far been taken to arbitration under the US-DR-CAFTA, 
which concerns the failure of Guatemala to effectively enforce its own labour 
law.63 Although the case was formally launched by the United States in 2010, 
the dispute settlement panel only reported its findings in June 2017. The Panel 
found in favour of Guatemala. While the United States was able to prove that, 
at eight different worksites, Guatemala had failed to enforce its labour law, 
they were unable to demonstrate that ‘these instances constitute a course 
of action or inaction that was in a manner affecting trade.’64 The Panel iden-
tified the legal test through which to determine whether action or inaction 
affected trade as: ‘a failure to effectively enforce a Party’s labor laws through a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction [that] confers some com-
petitive advantage on an employer or employers engaged in trade between the 
Parties.’65 Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Panel found that, col-
lectively, Guatemala’s law enforcement failures demonstrated a sustained or 
recurring course of action, but not conduct in a manner affecting trade. When 
the one law enforcement failure that was found to be affecting trade was con-
sidered separately, the Panel did not find a sustained or recurring course of 
action and, as such, did not find a breach of obligations.66
The approach of the Panel has been viewed by academic commentators 
as creating significant difficulties in terms of bringing successful cases in the 
future.67 It has been argued that, to demand ‘recurring or sustained action or 
inaction’ for each workplace that is the subject of the complaint, rather than 
across an entire industry or sector, is excessively onerous.68 This decision 
has also prompted a broader political crisis of confidence in the US model, 
with senior politicians and trade unions representatives contending that the 
outcome of the case proved that the labour provisions were unworkable.69 
63   The US Government formally requested cooperative labour consultations with Bahrain, 
but no case has yet been filed. See text to n 61.
64   In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the 
CAFTA-DR, Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty, Final Report of 
the Panel (14 June 2017).
65   ibid para 190.
66   ibid paras 590–594.
67   Phillip Paiement, ‘Leveraging Trade Agreements for Labor Law Enforcement: Drawing 
Lessons from the US-Guatemala CAFTA Dispute’ (2017) 49 Geo J Intl L 675; Tequila 
Brooks, ‘US−Guatemala Arbitration Panel Clarifies Effective Enforcement Under Labor 
Provisions of Free Trade Agreement’ (2018) 4 Intl Lab Rts Case L 45.
68   Paiement (n 67) 690.
69   See eg Press Release of Richard Neal and Bill Pascrell Jr, ‘Statements on Guatemala 
Labor Report’ (26 June 2017) <https://neal.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal 
-pascrell-statements-guatemala-labor-report> accessed 19 July 2019; Celeste Drake, ‘US 
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Arguably, however, greater problems exist in terms of getting cases to dispute 
settlement in the first place. Out of almost 50 complaints made so far under 
US FTAs (the vast majority of which relate to NAFTA), only the Guatemala 
case made it to the dispute settlement stage.70 Similarly to the situation with 
regard to EU FTAs, lack of political will on the part of the US administration 
has been identified as the rationale behind the failure to pursue more cases.71 
Collectively, these problems have led to the crisis in confidence in US labour 
provisions becoming analogous to that levelled at the EU’s regime.72
5 Reform of the EU and US Models
The inadequacy of the EU and US models has been widely recognised among 
proponents of labour provisions on both sides of the Atlantic. These concerns 
have not gone unaddressed. In both cases, efforts have been made to more 
effectively address labour issues through trade agreements. Although the 
reform agendas are motivated by different factors, one can argue that in some 
ways each suffers from the same deficiencies.
Driven by criticism from trade unions, NGOs, and the European Parliament, 
the European Commission embarked on a reform process in mid-2017.73 This 
process was not informed by any serious attempt to review the impact of the 
EU’s existing trade agreements on workers and their rights in the EU and 
trade partner countries, nor to seek to create mechanisms which  effectively 
address those issues. This is unsurprising, given the fact that, as identi-
fied above,  provisions to monitor the sustainable development – including 
labour – impact of EU FTAs have not been properly operationalised. Rather, 
the Commission’s review focused narrowly on proposals to strengthen exist-
ing mechanisms within TSD chapters. The Commission rejected the idea of 
stronger dispute settlement, which had been the key demand of many of those 
Trade Policy Fails Workers’ (AFL-CIO, 26 June 2017) <https://aflcio.org/2017/6/26/us 
-trade-policy-fails-workers> accessed 19 July 2019.
70   See ILO, ‘Social Dimensions FTAs’ (n 42) for an overview of many of these cases.
71   Axel Marx, Franz Ebert and Nicolas Hachez, ‘Dispute Settlement for Labour Provisions 
in EU Free Trade Agreements: Rethinking Current Approaches’ (2017) 5 Politics and 
Governance 49, 52. See also Vogt (n 46).
72   Cassandra Waters, ‘Labor Rights Protections in Trade Deals Don’t Work’ (AFL-CIO, 
24 October 2017) <https://aflcio.org/2017/10/24/labor-rights-protections-trade-deals-dont 
-work> accessed 19 July 2019. Such perceptions are also taking root in the academic 
 literature, Araujo B Melo, ‘Labour Provisions in EU and US Mega-Regional Trade 
Agreements: Rhetoric AND Reality’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 233.
73   Commission (n 40).
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calling for reform.74 In part, the Commission used the perceived inadequa-
cies of the US model as a rationale for this rejection.75 Instead, it promised a 
series of actions to ‘revamp the TSD chapters’, including working more closely 
and communicating better with key stakeholders; identifying, considering, and 
addressing priorities (i.e. action plans) for each partner country in relation to 
TSD issues; encouraging early ratification of core international agreements; 
enabling civil society to play their role in the implementation of TSD commit-
ments more effectively; and increasing the resources that would be available 
for the implementation of TSD chapters.76 Overall, these reforms hinge on 
using the existing mechanisms of the TSD chapters to undertake ‘more asser-
tive enforcement’ of key obligations.77
While some of these ‘revamps’ may address some of the problems previ-
ously identified with TSD chapters,78 key stakeholders – particularly in trade 
unions and NGOs – believe that serious deficiencies remain unaddressed.79 
On the one hand it is suggested that an opportunity to reform EU trade policy 
to put sustainable development, including the situation of workers in the EU 
and its trading partners, at the heart of EU trade agreements, has not been 
taken. TSD issues are still ‘ghettoised’ within single chapters of agreements, 
rather than seen as cross-cutting issues which are potentially relevant to all 
aspects of a trade agreement.80 On the other hand, there is scepticism that DG 
Trade, which is in charge of the negotiation and implementation of TSD 
74   See responses to the Commission’s non-paper on TSD chapters, Letter from Müller to 
Gallina (n 40). Most business organisations were opposed to the idea of stronger dispute 
settlement.
75   European Commission, ‘Feedback and Way Forward on Improving the Implementation 
and Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in EU Free Trade 
Agreements’ (26 February 2018) Non-Paper of the Commission Services <http://trade 
.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf> accessed 19 July 2019. As 
identified in the academic literature, there are a number of models for dispute settlement 
which could be drawn upon in these reform efforts. So the sole focus on the inadequacies 
of the US model looks inappropriate. See Axel Marx and others, Dispute Settlement in the 
Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters of EU Trade Agreements (Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies 2016).
76   ibid.
77   ibid.
78   For an evaluation of the reform proposals, see Harrison and others (n 30) 13.
79   See ‘Report of the Roundtable on Human Rights, Labour Rights and Sustainable 
Development in EU Trade Policy’ (25 May 2018) <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/
research/centres/chrp/governance/eutradeandlabour/report_of_roundtable_25.05.18 
.docx> accessed 19 July 2019.
80   Harrison and others (n 30) 20 offer some ideas on how the latter agenda could be 
achieved.
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chapters, has the political will to prioritise action on labour issues.81 It is early 
days in terms of an evaluation of the changes the reform process has actually 
given rise to. As this article was being finalised, the Commission announced it 
had requested formal consultations with the government of South Korea about 
its lack of implementation of fundamental labour rights.82 This suggests that 
the Commission may now be more willing to utilise the tools at its disposal 
to pursue a labour rights agenda. However, European labour representatives 
point out that the situation in Korea is particularly egregious and remain scep-
tical about the ability of the labour chapter’s soft dispute settlement process to 
produce meaningful results.83 Certainly the Commission’s overarching narra-
tive around its TSD agenda makes it clear that the EU’s approach will  continue 
to be largely defined by processes of soft cooperation and engagement over 
a range of sustainable development (including labour) issues, focusing on 
‘universalist’ concerns about perceived problems occurring within trade part-
ner countries.84
Consideration of issues in relation to workers in recent US trade policy is 
framed very differently. Central to Trump’s successful election campaign was 
the idea that future trade deals would ensure benefits to US workers. The 
nationalist rhetoric of the campaign made it clear that violations of labour 
rights abroad were a concern only to the extent that they provided unfair 
 competition which harmed workers in the United States. Once in power, 
Trump’s adoption of the ‘America First’ trade policy has been characterised by 
withdrawal from trade negotiations, and the imposition of tariffs with a view 
to creating uncertainty and disruption in the global trading system so as ‘to 
bring about new investment in the United States and the return of factories 
and manufacturing jobs.’85 At the same time, the administration has commit-
ted to a strategy of ‘bilateral trade negotiations to promote American industry, 
protect American workers, and raise American wages.’86
81   See Report of the Roundtable on Human Rights (n 79).
82   ‘Republic of Korea – compliance with obligations under Chapter 13 of the EU–Korea Free 
Trade Agreement’, Request for Consultations by the European Union’ (17 December 2018).
83   European Trade Union Confederation, ‘Trade & Labour Rights: Toothless Deals Need 
Teeth!’ (17 December 2018) <www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/trade-labour-rights-toothless 
-deals-need-teeth> accessed 19 July 2019.
84  Commission (n 75).
85   Shawn Donnan, ‘Trump’s Tariff Strategy Sharpens America First Focus’ Financial Times 
(London, 15 June 2018) <www.ft.com/content/e52c9bac-70b9-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914> 
accessed 19 July 2019.
86   The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Press Release, ‘Presidential 
Memorandum Regard ing Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Negotiations and Agreement’ (23 January 2017) <www.whitehouse.gov/the 
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Within this broader policy-framework, the renegotiation of the NAFTA in 
the form of the draft United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) pro-
vides the first opportunity to evaluate what this means for labour  provisions. 
As with the Commission’s reform agenda, US reforms are not based on any 
attempt to analyse the impact of the existing NAFTA agreement on  workers’ 
rights. It is therefore again unsurprising that commentators have found that, 
while the reformed labour chapter ‘entails some interesting legal  innovations, 
the opportunity to address the main structural problems of US trade agree-
ments to date in terms of labour rights has largely been missed.’87 Most 
 prominent among the reforms, there is a new test to decide what consti-
tutes ‘in a manner affecting trade’ that lowers the standard to find a breach 
and could make successful cases more likely.88 But the problems of accessing 
dispute settlement in the first place remain unaddressed. Critics have there-
fore questioned whether this change will in fact lead to more successful cases 
being brought.89
Unlike the EU reforms, labour provisions in the USMCA have broken free 
from their ‘ghettoisation’ in the labour chapter and have found their way 
into the ‘Rules of Origin Chapter’. The latter chapter provides that vehicles 
produced within the territory of USMCA countries must have a minimum 
 percentage of component parts produced by workers paid a minimum of 
USD 16/hour in order to qualify for duty-free treatment.90 This is the first time 
that such minimum wage requirements have been used within the technical 
rules that govern the production of products in an FTA.91 At the same time, 
these provisions are limited in scope, applying only to the automobile sector, 
and it remains to be seen what their impact will be in practice. Overall, and 
-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states 
-trans-pacific> accessed 19 July 2019.
87   Franz Ebert and Pedro A Villarreal, ‘The Renegotiated “NAFTA”: What Is in It for Labor 
Rights?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 11 October 2018) <www.ejiltalk.org/the-renegotiated-nafta-what-is 
-in-it-for-labor-rights/> accessed 19 July 2019.
88   Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and 
Canada (adopted 30 September 2018, not entered into force) art 23.5 (USMCA).
89   Ebert and Villareal (n 87).
90   USMCA, ch 4, Rules of Origin.
91   Ebert and Villareal, (n 87) who also give a more detailed description of how the scheme 
operates and a critique of its limitations and failings. The US approach both extends the 
scope of labour provisions beyond core labour standards to wage issues and takes labour 
issues beyond their traditional home in labour chapters and connects them up with 
mechanisms for addressing workers’ rights in other chapters of the FTA. See Harrison 
and others (n 30) 20, which raises both strategies as potentially important in the context 
of universalist approaches to addressing workers’ rights issues.
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similarly to their EU counterparts, US reforms are not grounded in a detailed 
evaluation of the impact of FTAs on workers’ lives, and the strengths and defi-
ciencies of previous labour provisions for addressing those issues.
6 Conclusion
Labour provisions in FTAs have proliferated in recent years. Public rhetoric 
from politicians and trade officials has suggested that these provisions are 
vital to ensure that the social dimensions of globalisation are addressed. In 
the United States, this rhetoric has increasingly been tied to a nationalistic 
vision focussed on American workers. In the EU, it is couched in universalis-
tic terms, aspiring to advance the interests of workers globally. Whatever the 
explicit framing, it is vital to scrutinise carefully what effects labour provisions 
are actually having in reality. New forms of research into the effects of labour 
provisions in FTAs have helped to reveal their limited effectiveness. Reforms 
which seek to strengthen labour provisions have only been enacted recently 
and more time is needed to properly evaluate them. But lack of reflection on 
past failures, coupled with limited ambition in reform agendas on both sides of 
the Atlantic, speak against high expectations.
These issues should not come as a surprise to key actors within the trade 
regime. Academic studies have found that labour provisions have not been a 
priority of those charged with negotiating and implementing trade policy in 
either the United States or the EU. They have largely been a sideshow to the 
main business of implementing liberalisation commitments and commercial 
regulatory requirements, which are perceived to be where the benefits of trade 
agreements lie. By focusing attention on the gap between rhetoric and reality 
in relation to the labour rights agenda, the hope is that policymakers could be 
pushed to answer critical questions about trade policy. In the United States, this 
attention should provoke questions about whether reformed labour  provisions 
will contribute to a new vision of trade policy centred on the  interests of the 
American worker, as opposed to the interests of American owned  businesses. 
In the EU, it should raise concerns about whether workers’ interests globally 
are a central policy concern, or a makeweight that creates political buy-in 
among key constituents for a strong liberalisation and commercial regulatory 
agenda. Globally, these findings should prompt new forms of reflection about 
the critical lessons to be learnt from the trade and labour story. The deficiencies 
of labour provisions, coupled with the strength of provisions that promote the 
interests of capital, such as investment and intellectual property  protections, 
mean that it is perhaps more illuminating to see the trade and labour story so 
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far as more about class struggle than a struggle between the interests of devel-
oped and developing countries.
For many in the mainstream trade community of policymakers and  scholars, 
fears about labour standards encouraging disguised protectionism have cre-
ated an ambivalence about the labour rights agenda.92 If rhetoric and reality 
were more closely aligned, US labour provisions could lead to those fears being 
realised. But more attention should be directed to the potential of labour pro-
visions inspired by a universalist vision. The diversity of potential approaches 
speaks to the need for individual scrutiny of the actual impact of particular 
proposals, alongside other strategies for protecting and promoting the inter-
ests of workers in a globalised economy.93 Overall, such an agenda should be 
of widespread interest, given the threats to economic globalisation posed by 
the current political climate. Even some of the most ardent proponents of 
trade liberalisation and integration are beginning to recognise the potential 
problems with mainstream trade policy for vulnerable workers everywhere. 
For instance, a joint report by the IMF, World Bank and WTO concluded in 
2017 that ‘adjustment to trade can bring a human and economic downside 
that is frequently concentrated, sometimes harsh, and has too often become 
prolonged.’94 There is an urgent need to tackle these issues. It is time for the 
academic and trade policy community to pay more focused attention to 
the policy tools which purport to address them.
92   The academic literature was most prominent on this issue in the early trade-labour link-
age debates, see eg Compa and Diamond (n 13). My personal experience in numerous 
conversations with policymakers and scholars is that the same concerns are still widely 
prevalent. But the failures of actual labour standards provisions to have significant effects 
has meant that, in practice, they can be ignored by many in the field.
93   See Harrison and others (n 30) 20 for a synopsis of some potential strategies for better 
protecting and promoting the rights and interests of  workers through FTAs. Such proposals 
should be considered alongside other forms of support for workers. See eg Dylan Geraets, 
‘Ensuring Continued Support for the Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System: The Need 
for a Public–Private Approach’ (2018) 21 JIEL 433; Michael J Trebilcock and Sally Wong, 
‘Trade, Technology, and Transitions: Trampolines or Safety Nets for Displaced Workers?’ 
(2018) 21 JIEL 509.
94   IMF, World Bank and WTO, ‘Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for 
Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment’ (2017) <www.imf.org/en/Publications/ 
Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/04/08/making-trade-an-engine-of-growth-for-all> accessed 19 
July 2019.
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